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The International Recognition of National Rights:
The Baltic States' Case
Igor Grazing
INTRODUCrION
Inherent in an international law of recognition is the right to
be recognized according to international law as well as to be rec-
ognized by the world community. Initially, there is no need to
name all the possible and potential subjects of international law
ranging from private individuals to states. It is enough to begin
with the statement that "nations," whatever this word may mean in
international law, are included among these subjects.
The legal relations between nations tend to have different
frameworks which are in some way connected to the social organi-
zation of the individual states. The relationship between two uni-
tary nation-states (e.g., France and Italy, France and Germany, Ger-
many and Hungary) is the simplest example, though not always
simple in political and legal practice. These relations create a
specific set of problems concerning the legal status of ethnic mi-
norities. To a considerable extent, the minorities in such nation-
states are really minorities, and their rights are determined by
internal or municipal law and reflect the political goals and the
nature of the political regime of aogiven state. The political and
cultural rights of Swedes on the Aland islands (though once a
matter of international concern) are determined by the internal
laws of Finland. The rights of ethnic and native Indians in North
America have been the internal affair of Canada and the United
States. Nonetheless, in the post-World War II pehiod, one cannot
say that these types of relations between ethnic and national mi-
norities and majorities are irrelevant in international law. Two
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basic documents on human rights and the appearance of interna-
tional human rights law itself provide certain international guaran-
tees for such minorities in nation-states.
The international dimension of the rights of ethnic minorities
also appears in connection with another situation: an ethnic mi-
nority disapproves of the nation-state in which it resides while that
ethnic group is simultaneously the majority of some other state,
and this other nation-state appears concerned with the ethnic
minority's situation in the other nation-state. For example, the
same group of Swedes on Aland is not only a specific ethnic mi-
nority in Finland, but it is also a society that has a specific cul-
tural, ethnic, and sometimes evenoPolitical relationship with anoth-
er nation-state, Sweden. In the Aland case, all of the problems
arising from this situation were resolved in a friendly manner. The
Cyprus situtation, however, illustrates the converse result where the
relationship of two ethnic groups to their ethnic motherlands has
caused permanent political and legal tension. This type of relation-
ship has caused very dangerous situations in history and has served
as a pretext for naked aggression. One example of this aggression
is the occupation of part of Czechoslovakia by Hitler during World
War II under the pretext of protecting the Sfideten-German mi-
nority. The opposite example in our day is the Polish-Lithuanian
relations, in which the rights of the Polish minority in Lithuania
have been negotiated by the governments of these two states.
A third category of ethnic relations relevant for international
legal analysis is the category arising out of the appearance or res-
toration of nation-states which have ceased to exist as a result of
different circumstances, most notably due to circumstances within
the scope of international legal regulations. In fact, the phenome-
non of "terra nullius" no longer exits. No longer is there a proce-
dure for the realization of national rights through the creation or
restoration of a nation-state. A process of acquiring legal rights by
restoration inevitably influences the set of legal rights and political
interests of the states that are already members of the world com-
munity. Now international law and the existing world order have
to meet a serious challenge: whether to preserve themselves un-
touched at the price of negating certain rights of some nations, or
to accept general political and legal principles that may change
the political map in the course of a renaissance of nations that
are not members of the world community today.
This challenge may create antagonism between international
legality and political pragmatism. But I sincerely believe that, in
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the long run, the preservation of the principles of international
law may also bring pragmatic dividends. One, question remains:
What are the international rights of ethnic minorities who have
expressed their will to obtain, or, as it was recently in the Baltics,
to restore, their statehood and who today are a part of some oth-
er unitary or federal state?
This Article will discuss this question in reference to the status
of the Baltic states as it was prior to August 18, 1991. The Baltic
states' case, although happily resolved with Lithuania, Latvia, and
Estonia once again recognized members of the family of indepen-
dent states, provides a source for a valuable lesson. The legal
aspect of the Baltic states' recent struggle for freedom discloses
certain problems within international law that deserve academic
discussion and whose solution should be of some political and
international legal value. The main thesis of this Article may be
summed up in one sentence. The right of self-determination,
while not an ethnic right, protects the interests of an ethnic mi-
nority when and if it is raised to the level of political claims. Part
I studies theories concerning ethnic rights and self-determination,
and Part II is devoted to the case study and tries to reveal the
political and legal dimensions of valid claims for self-determina-
tion.
I. THE PROTECTION OF ETHNIC RIGHTS AND
NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION
Generally, it has been accepted that there are no binding
rules in international law that create an obligation for an existing
state to recognize the appearance of a new state. Hersch
Lauterpacht Stated: 'The principal feature of the prevalent doc-
trine of recognition of States is the assertion that recognition is, in
its essential aspect, namely, in relation to the community claiming
it, an act of policy as distinguished from the fulfillment of a legal
duty."' On the contrary, recognition that may be considered pre-
mature may be qualified as a "tortious act against the lawful gov-
ernment; it is a breach of international law."' A typical example
of this is the immediate recognition by an aggressor of a puppet
regime which it created. Historical examples of this include the
recognition of the puppet Kuusinen government in Finland by
1 H. LAuTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 7 (1947).
2 Id. at 95.
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Stalin and the newborn fascist Slovak state by Hitler during World
War II.
This legal idea is based on the assumption that the former
state is opposed to the appearance of the new one, and the cre-
ation of the new state contradicts the former state's political and
legal intent. Unfortunately, this is often the case and not only in
such extreme cases as mentioned above. History provides us with
many examples in which the appearance of a new state whose
population constituted the former ethnic minority contradicted the
will of the former home-state. The Russian, Austro-Hungarian, and
Ottoman Empires, dismembered under the strong political and
military pressure of World War I, gave birth to many new states in
Europe including Greece, Poland, Yugoslavia, Finland, and the
Baltic states to mention only a few. The United States also, though
not ethnically unified as a nation, did not ask permission of Great
Britain to create a new state.
The lack of a binding rule creating an obligation of recogni-
tion (of an ethnic group, a state) is not a symmetric phenome-
non. In other words, though the former state has no duty to rec-
ognize, the national or ethnic group, nonetheless, does have the
right to exercise its expression of will to "determine" itself under
the rules of international law. International law has accepted that
a national group or ethnic community may claim its will for self-
determination. Nonetheless, this does not create a duty for the
already existing members of the world community to accept this
claim.
This inconsistency raises at least two questions: (1) who consti-
tutes the group that has the internationally-tolerated right of self-
determination, and (2) in what form do such claims have to be
presented in order to be valid with respect to international law?
According to the texts of international law, the right of self-
determination belongs to the peoples' or to the nations. The
latter may be derived from the fact that the Declaration on
3 See Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, GA. Res. 2625, 25
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970), reprinted in 9 1.LM. 1292
[hereinafter Declaration on Friendly Relations]; International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force, Mar. 23,
1976); International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, opened for signa-
ture, Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976); Declaration on the
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples of 1960, art. 2, GA. Res. 1514, 15
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1961) [hereinafter Declaration on
Decolonization].
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Friendly Relations simultaneously protects both the rights of peo-
ple and the "national unity and territorial Integrity" of states and
countries.4 The connection between peoples' and national claims
for self-determination can also be found in the chapter of the
Declaration on Friendly Relations entitled 'The Principle of Equal
Rights and Self-Determination of Peoples." It states: 'The establish-
ment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or
integration with an independent State or the emergence into any
other political status freely determined by a people constitute
modes of implementing the right of self-determination by that
people."5
Therefore, the right of self-determination is provided to the
peoples, specifically, dominantly ethnic unities, but the claim it-
self-the "establishment of a sovereign and independent State,"--is
of a political and national character.' National self-determination
and the peoples' right of self-determination are thus, to some
extent, equal and synonymous.
This thesis requires further comment. First, while these no-
tions coexist, they are not identical. As Johannes Mattern noted in
1928, these notions historically were interpreted differently.7 Using
the constitutional documents of the French Revolution as a base,
he argues that the principal difference between them is that if the
"nation" means the people, "not as a social, but as a political
organism," or people as a state, then popular sovereignty, or the
sovereignty of people, refers to the right to execute political power
without any delegation of it to other political structures.'
Second, the above-mentioned distinction, though valid today,
does not exhaust all of the possible meanings of "nation." Besides
this political meaning, the distinction also accepts the ethnic quali-
ty of the term. Some provisions of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights9 and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights' 9 are also evidently aimed at the pro-
tection of purely ethnic national rights. This interpretation may be
found in some regional documents of international law. For in-
4 Dedaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 3, at 122.
5 Id. at 124.
6 Id.
7 J. MATTERN, CONCEPTS OF STATE, SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 27-30
(1928).
8 Id.
9 GA Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).
10 Supra note 3.
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stance, the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights"
specifies in article 20 the peoples' right to existence, 12 and in
article 22 their right to "economic, social and cultural develop-
ment with due regard to their... identity.""
Therefore, although the notion of "nationality" does not refer
solely to ethnic groups and is not exhausted by the forms of polit-
ical organization of a given group, the peoples' right of self-deter-
mination is, nevertheless, one method of protecting the rights of
ethnic minorities. Using Mattern's terminology, the ethnic majori-
ty, formerly the minority, is protected through its becoming a
nation.
Both in theory and in fact, the group that utilizes its right of
self-determination may not be ethnically homogeneous at all. Be-
cause a nation is formed on a political rather than on an ethnic
basis, it follows that self-determination in the form of obtaining or
restoring statehood is not entirely an ethnic act. Although, in fact,
the lead in a political movement for obtaining or restoring state-
hood may be grasped by a dominant ethnic group that is a minor-
ity in relation to the State population, this does not change the
nature of the right from a national one to an ethnic one. This
fact has sometimes been overemphasized for propagandistic rea-
sons. The national movements in the Baltic states-officially called
popular fronts-have been presented by Soviet propaganda not as
national movements in the international legal sense of the word,
but as ethnically nationalistic. But Helene Carrere D'Encausse
writes:
The nation in Europe, even in Eastern Europe, is not tribal;
the passionate desire to consolidate the nation within the
framework of the state does not imply any slippage toward
tribalism. The attachment to the nation, to the larger commu-
nity, cemented by territorial proximity and a common past,
endowed with accepted structures, is the accomplishment of
civilized man. It is an advancement over primitive society, not a
regression toward it.14
In spite of subjective motives and other secondary circumstances,
the national movement towards the realization of the right of self-
11 June 26, 1981, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev. 5, re/rinted in 21 I.L.M. 59 (en-
tered into fore Oct. 21, 1986).
12 Id. at art. 20.
13 Id. at art. 22.
14 D'Encausse, Springtime of Nations, THE NEW REPUBUC 22, Jan. 21, 1991.
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determination should not be ethnic in nature if it wants to be
recognized by international law.
If the "self" in the self-determination is ethnically divergent,
though still an ethnically dominant minority in. itself, it becomes
especially complicated to determine the scope of a group to which
this right of self-determination -may really belong. In his classic
work, Secession, Lee S. Buchheit puts forward two main criteria for
the group: (1) The subjective self-perception of the group needs
to be distinct from the others; and (2) the group must have ob-
jective characteristics which distinguish it from the ambient popu-
lation."5 Examples of such characteristics include "elements of a
religious, historic, geographic, ethnologic, economic, linguistic, and
racial character."16 At the same time, it is evident that these crite-
ria, even when present, are not "sufficient" by themselves. More-
over, the inability to meet both of these criteria. sometimes has
not been an obstacle to self-determination. The United States at
the end of the 18th century, for example, met only one objective
criteria, geography, necessary for it to secede from the British
Empire and to self-determine. Nonetheless, it did secede. At the
same time, the almost total identity of Swiss Germans does not
grant them a right to secede that can be admitted by international
law.
These circumstances may well imply an agnostic point of view
such as Buchheit's. "The international jurist can act only as histori-
an, chronicling instances of valid claims to self-determination after
they succeed but unable to offer an opinion concerning their le-
gitimacy before they reach, or fall to reach, fruition."1"
A. The Recognition of the Scope of Claims
Although it is almost impossible to determine the "self" aspect
in self-determination, additional criteria make the acceptance of
these claims more probable.
The first criteria is the political character of such claims. Con-
sidering purely ethnic rights (the preservation of culture, religion,
language), the internationally accepted rule does not imply that
ethnic authorities have the right to create their own, new nation-
states. This precedent can be seen in the Western Sahara' case, in
15 L. BucHHErr, SECESSION 9-11 (1978).
16 Id.
17 Id. at 45.
18 Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion), 1975 l.C.J. 12.
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which the International Court of Justice held that the right of self-
determination does not inevitably imply the creation of a new
state. On the contrary, the advisory opinion stated that the Gener-
al Assembly of the United Nations retained "a measure of discre-
tion with respect to the forms ... by which that right is to be
realized." 9
The settlement of the previously mentioned Aland islands
question in 1921 exemplifies the case in which ethnic rights were
still protected even though no evident claims for the creation of a
new state were asserted. The International Commission of Jurists
acting on the behalf of the League of Nations decided in favor of
Finland's sovereignty over this territory, but at the same time,
provided the Swedish population the guaranteed right to preserve
its language, national way of life, and other rights. 20 The report
presented to the Council of the League of Nations stated:
To concede to minorities, either of language or religion, or to
any fractions of a population the right of withdrawing from the
community to which they belong, because it is their wish or
their good pleasure, would be to destroy order and stability
within States and to inaugurate anarchy in international life. It
would be to uphold a theory incompatible with the very ideas
of the State as a territorial and political unity.
21
Combining the advisory opinion in the Western Sahara case
and the current policy of the United Nations, this cannot be con-
sidered a binding rule of international law. Instead, these docu-
ments state the political practice or preference that purely ethnic
rights of national groups are not considered to be the exhaustive
foundation for self-determination to the extent of claiming the
right to create an independent state. Rather, the rights of ethnic
groups are protected through the administration of certain individ-
ual human rights such as the right to education, to proper med-
ical treatment, to free exercise of religion, etc. Some exceptional
decisions concerning the preservation of certain cultures and ways
of life made by specialized international institutions do not under-
mine this general principle. The International Labor Organization
(ILO) preservation of tribal or semi-tribal nations is one example.
Two ILO documents concerning the rights of tribal and semi-
tribal peoples in independent states show the protection of purely
19 Id. at para. 7.
20 See HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY AND SELF-DETERMINATION 38 (1990).
21 Id. at 30.
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ethnic rights.' The documents dealing with the rights of ethnic,
social, and socio-ethnic character provide protection to the ethnic
identity of mentioned social groups and protect their members
against social and economic discrimination. The documents do
not, however, derive any direct political or "self-determinational"
consequences from the necessity of providing such protection. It is
important to note that these specialized documents are aimed at
protecting peoples of a "less advanced stage" of development and
even, as such, may be interpreted in a fairly restricted way.' The
same may be said of the Declaration on the Elimination of All
Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or
Belief. 4
The statement closest to relating ethnic rights to the right of
self-determination is article 1 of the U.N.'s Declaration of the
Right to Development.' Article 1 states: 'The human right to
development also implies the full realization of the right of peo-
ples to self-determination, which includes ... the exercise of their
inalienable right to full sovereignty over all their natural wealth
and resources."26
This "full sovereignty" may be understood as statehood or any
other political entity, but the clause considering "natural wealth"
and "resources" implies the protection of natural items that consti-
tute part of the ethnic-cultural environment of a given socio-ethnic
group, such as hunting and pasture-land for nomadic people, or
wood areas for gatherers. Therefore, the existence of a state orga-
nization does not constitute the conditio sine qua non for popular
development under the logic of this Act.
Accordingly, the need to protect certain ethnic interests is
considered to be one reason to exercise the right of self-determi-
nation. This interest, however, is internationally accepted as a
22 S&e International Labor Organization Convention (No. 169) Concerning Indige-
nous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, opened for signature June 27, 1989, 72
INT'L LAB. OFF. OFFICIAL BULL. 59 (Ser. A, No. 2), reprinted in 28 I.LM. 1382; Interna-
tional Labor Organization Convention (No. 107) Concerning the Protection and Integra-
tion of Indigenous and other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Coun-
tries, June 26, 1957, 328 U.N.T.S. 247 (entered into force, June 2, 1959) [hereinafter Con-
vention No. 107].
23 Convention No. 107, supra note 22, at art. l(a).
24 GA. Res. 36/55, 36 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 171, U.N. Doc A/36/684
(1981), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 205.
25 GA Res. 41/128, 41 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 53) at 21, U.N. Doc. A/41/925
(1986).
26 Id. at art. 1.
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justifiable foundation for such an exercise if, and only if, other
justifying elements are also present. As stated earlier, "nation," in
the modern understanding of the word, means a "politically orga-
nized society. " 17 This doctrinal position can also be found in
some modern international documents which are accepted as
legally significant for international law.
The extent to which the Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO) is accepted as a sole representative of the Palestinian peo-
ple is irrelevant, especially after the political failure of Yasir Arafat
in the Gulf War of 1991. Nonetheless, the PLO has observer's sta-
tus in the United Nations, making the PLO's position a potential
subject in international law. Article 6 of the Palestinian National
Charter of 1968 states that "the Jews who had normally resided in
Palestine until the beginning of Zionist invasion will be considered
Palestinians."" This confirms once again the political character of
the national unification. The right of self-determination, at least to
the extent of obtaining or restoring statehood as a means of pro-
tecting ethnic interests, is not derived directly from these interests,
nor is the right determined by them. On the contrary, the right of
self-determination may be executed only if national or political
justifications also support such an exercise.
As mentioned above, "self-hood" or being a "self," has both
objective and subjective aspects. Correspondingly, a social group
determining itself must possess not only ethnic, but also political
self-consciousness. This dual aspect of "self-hood" means that the
social group must have not only organizational forms of ethnic
self-consciousness like ethnic, cultural organizations, linguistic
clubs, but also political units such as political parties, newspapers,
and declarations. A group must also have objective grounds for
expressing political diversity. In a purely speculative and non-ex-
haustive way, three possible justifying items are: (1) Political di-
versity manifested in the nonacceptance by the national minority
of a political regime or the constitutional forms of the dominant
state; (2) the deprivation of the right to political autonomy, or
certain elements of independent statehood (or at least of consider-
able self-governance); or (3) the failure of the dominant state to
recognize the former or independent state. Regardless of how this
27 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
28 PALESTINE NATIONAL CHARTER OF 1968, reprinted in 3 THE ARAB-ISRAELi CONFLICT
706 (J. Moore ed. 1974).
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autonomy or statehood was lost, it is enough that some elements
of it still remain in existence today.
B. Embryonic Statehood
The elements that remain after statehood or autonomy is lost
may manifest themselves in many ways. They may take form in the
federal composition of the dominant state. For example, the sub-
jects of federalism may preserve some elements of statehood and
not be merely units of administrative territorial composition. The
elements also may take the form of special political entities such
as protected territories, demilitarized zones, colonial or occupied
territories, or in specific forms of national representation like
governments in exile or PLO-type organizations.
These elements are not a complete solution to the problem
posed by Buchheit that the criteria for determining the right of
national self-determination are vague, but at least they do aid the
determination in a broad sense. This Article asserts not only that
ethnic self-consciousness and objective ethnic criteria are necessary,
but that the political dimensions of both are also important for an
ethnic minority's right of ,self-determination to be recognized by
the other subjects of international law. Better protection of the
rights of a given ethnic minority is not achieved by itself, but is a
kind of by-product of political self-determination.
I am unable to produce an example of the first political crite-
rion-the distinction of political regimes and of constitutional
forms-in the post-colonial period of the twentieth century. But a
good example from earlier history is the United States' Declara-
tion of Independence. This document typifies full scale political
collision. The political interests of Britain and the American colo-
nies differed greatly, as did their economic strategies and their
understanding of proper legal and constitutional order.
The meeting of the second criterion-the obtainment or res-
toration of statehood by a more or less autonomous region or
people--is more typical in the present world order, though it
existed in earlier history as well. Examples of this include, at least
theoretically, the present autonomy of republics in the Soviet Un-
ion and Yugoslavia, and the birth or rebirth of other European
nations like Poland and Finland. Both Poland and Finland were
fairly autonomous provinces of czarist Russia, and Poland was also
once an independent state, as it is again. Hungary and Ozechoslo-
1991]
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vakia also possessed a certain degree of national autonomy when
they were states within the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
The recognition and the acceptance of this criterion is a
delicate matter for an international lawyer who so often must
admit the dominance of political pragmatism and political (often
disturbingly violent) facts over the rule of international law. Be-
cause this criterion introduces the element of at least some legal
continuity into the process of national or popular self-determina-
tion, it merits close consideration. This conclusion may be logically
derived from the fact that the very existence of certain autono-
mous rights, as accepted by the dominant state, implies the domi-
nant state's nolens-volens acceptance of the specific subjectivity of
that group of people and territory. If the dominant state gives
some autonomous rights to its subdivision, it accepts this subdi-
vision, at least implicitly, as a potential subject of self-determina-
tion, even if it does not admit it. In this sense, the appearance of
a new independent state which was formerly an autonomous prov-
ince or colony of another state, is to some extent derived from
the legal status and acceptance of such a specific status. This con-
clusion is in line with the international legal concept of recogni-
tion of states that Lauterpacht called "the constitutive view."2
The legal validity of the claims of self-determination of such
social groups and territories may be derived as well from facts of
an opposite legal character. I do not mean the case where the
autonomy of a part of the former state is admitted by the latter,
but rather when the former has become part of the latter domi-
nant state as a result of international misconduct by the dominant
state. Aggression, occupation, annexation, or the imposition of an
unequal contract by the threat of force are some examples of
international misconduct which would lead to this result. But in
these cases, even if the occupied territories are refused any auton-
omous status, the right of self-determination, though ignored by
the dominant state, is derived legally not only ipso facto from
international law, but also from the actual legal position of the
dominant state that can be qualified as an aggressor.
C. The Problem of "Infinite Divisibility"
One of the counter-arguments for the unrestricted and uncon-
ditional recognition of national or popular self-determination is
29 H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 1, at 38-41.
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the danger of "infinite divisibility."3° Buchheit states "no state, no
nation, has a population so homogeneous that it cannot be subdi-
vided into smaller groups of greater homogeneity simply by alter-
ing the standards of what constitutes a 'distinct' group."'1
This divisibility, or so called "Balkanization," may in fact be
the case, but after adopting the "political criteria" for self-determi-
nation this argument fails with respect to the "infiniteness" compo-
nent. The number of nations and territories that may potentially
obtain or restore their statehood is not, in fact, infinite; rather, it
may be predicted with some precision. The nations eligible in-
clude once occupied territories that may wish to return or rejoin
their former motherlands (it is possible that Moldavia in the USSR
will want to "self-determine" herself as a part of Romania); territo-
ries that may wish to raise their political status (Puerto Rico, for
instance, to become a state in the U.S., or the autonomous repub-
lics in the U.S.S.R. to become full-scale republics); and subjects to
federations (I mean real federations with some rights of political
autonomy as was the case in the Ore-Civil War U.S.) that may wish
to obtain or restore their independent statehood (Baltic states in
U.S.S.R., and Slovenia and Croatia in Yugoslavia).
If we count all these instances, we will determine the maxi-
mum number of states subject to potential division. The political
realities, including the lack of political distinction, in many of
these cases further decreases this number. The criterion of "politi-
cal distinction" raises a critical point in those cases where the
dominant state is an empire with some type of totalitarian regime.
In democratic federations, such problems may tend to be settled
by gradual political treatment without critical outbursts. The recog-
nition of the right of self-determination may create some possibili-
ties for further divisibility, but this increased divisibility will not be
very large or "infinite." The mechanisms worked out since the
1975 Helsinki summit by the Conference on Security and Co-oper-
30 Se L BUCHHErr, supra note 15, at 28.
31 In another passage Buchheit writes:
The world community cannot indiscriminately advocate the disintegration of all
polyethnic States, because to do so would create vast confusion in the current
inter-State system and might well' defeat its own purpose of promoting conditions
for social and economic welfare by resulting in a proliferation of tiny ethnic
communities Jacking an economic base of viable political structure.
Id at 222.
But even here I see the considerations to be of a political character (the expedi-
ency of self-determination) rather than of a legal one (the denying of the right itself).
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ation in Europe (CSCE) have created a model for peaceful settle-
ment of such problems by international control, so that dangerous
disruptions of the existing World Order can be avoided. 2
II. THE POLITICAL NATURE OF BALTIC CLAIMs
This Article will not deal with the objective grounds of the
Baltics people's right of self-determination. Though these objective
grounds were very important, they were covered by the fact that
three Baltic states, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, obtained their
independent statehood in 1920 and had been recognized as such
by the world community. This means that they met the standards
for self-determination put forward by the existing law of that time.
The purely ethnic aspects of their self-determination, though
of a considerable importance for the political justification of the
secessionist claims of these republics or states, were not decisive
from the point of view of the theory proffered in this Article. The
mass deportations and massacres carried out on the Baltic Territo-
ries in 1940-41 and at the end of the 1940s were international
crimes according to articles 1 and 2 of the Convention of the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.33 The acts
aimed at the assimilation of the Baltic ethnic groups into the
Soviet Union and their sovietization justified their claims for cul-
tural and ethnic protection.' These facts, however, did not justify
their right of self-determination to the extent of restoring their statehood.
The international legality of the Baltic claims to restore their
statehood was based on the combination of two matters. First, they
were and remained victims of aggression and continuing military
occupation, plus they were subjects to a federation that had itself
recognized the sovereignty of its constituent parts. These factors
constituted the objective criterion. Second, they had clearly ex-
pressed their political will to self-determine themselves through the
restoration of their independent statehood, thus meeting the sub-
jective criterion.
32 See Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting 1986 of Representatives of the
Participating States of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Jan. 17,
1989, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 527 (1989) [hereinafter Vienna Document].
33 Dec. 9, 1948, _ U.S.T ., T.IA.S. No __.__ 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into fore,-
Jan. 12, 1951; for the United States, Feb. 23, 1989).
34 The population of non-Estonians in Estonia that constituted 4.7% in 1922 has
risen in the years of Soviet rule in the following way: 1959-22.3%; 1970-28.2% 1989-
35.2%.
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The objective criterion was strengthened by the "political
distinction" aspect as well. The Soviet Union was, and still remains,
a "socialist," or totalitarian, state with an administratively con-
trolled economy, whereas the Baltic states were becoming (and
desired to be) parliamentarian democratic states based on market
economy. As mentioned previously, this real political distinction
was intentionally camouflaged by official Soviet propaganda that
has sometimes influenced Western attitudes towards the popular
movements in the Baltic states, particularly in the early stages of
those movements. s5
The correct view was presented in the report given in The New
York Times on February 9, 1991:
In an intensifying propaganda barrage over state television,
Moscow has tried to present the confrontation in Lithuania as
pitting "nationalist totalitarianism" against ethnic minorities. But
the lines are not so neatly drawn. Immediately across the river
from the barricaded Parliament stands a Russian Orthodox
Church where, during the regular morning service last Sunday,
Father Pyotr Muller preached a fiery sermon urging his congre-
gation to vote "yes" with the Lithuanians.
About five parishioners walked out, and that, Father Mul-
ler said later in the week, is about the proportion of the set-
tled Russians-as compared to soldiers and recent arrivals-who
will either boycott or vote no. His parishioners, he says, are
Russians who have lived here for decades, and they are as sick
of Soviet power as he is. His father and his uncle perished
under Stalin.
"As long as the Communist Party is clinging to power in
the Soviet Union, we should leave the union," he said in a
booming voice. "Nobody here mistreats the Russians. That's all
clearly a provocation of the Communists; they want to create
an artificial tension."3
35 It is worth mentioning that this criteria of "political distinction" between the Bal-
tic states and Moscow remains sound even after the collapse of the Communist regime in
August 1991. After the coup, the distinction took another shape: the Baltic states con-
tinued to move toward restoring parliamentary regimes while Russia started to turn to-
ward another type of political regime-conditionally labelled "enlightened despotism." See
Shanglin & Corwin, Ti Old Face of Russia, U.S. NEws AND WoRLD REPORT, Nov. 11,
1991, at 48-49. Although the distinction may presently seem unclear (the regimes in the
Baltic states in the late 1930s included some evident elements of authoritarianism), it still
can be said that the political regimes now in existence in the Baltic states and Russia are
too different to be combined in one state.
36 Schmemann, Shadow of Moscow Daikens Lithuania Independence Vote, N.Y. Times, Feb.
9, 1991, at 2, col. 2.
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The multi-ethnic composition of the secessionist movement is
proof of the movement's political character. Though the Lithuani-
ans protected their ethnic interests through their status as an
independent republic, they wanted to obtain their status as a na-
tion, that is as a political unit, thereby consolidating and express-
ing the interest of other ethnic groups.
The nonethnic and nonreligious character of the differences
between the Baltic states and the U.S.S.R. was further proven by a
paradoxical instance. Contrary to the position of Father Muller
(shared by the Russian Orthodox Archbishop of Lithuania,
Khrisostom), the patriarch of Russian Orthodox Church, Alexsy II,
signed, along with the higher commanders of the Soviet Army, a
joint statement demanding that the President of the U.S.S.R. use
"all means at [his] disposal" to "introduce the martial law and
direct Presidential rule" in the Baltic states and some other re-
gions of the Soviet Union.
The decisive legal fact justifying the Baltic states' radical
claims for self-determination, including the right of secession from
the Soviet Union, was the Soviet Union's aggression against the
Baltic states in 1940 and its continuing occupation of the Baltics
thereafter.
A. The Legal Relations Between the U.S.S.R. and Baltic States in 1940
The fatal course of events beginning in 1940 for the Baltic
states is well-known and requires mention of only some basic fea-
tures.
3 7
The Baltic states-Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, (parts of the
old Russian Empire)-gained their independence from Russia in
1920. Russia recognized their independence through a set of bilat-
eral peace treaties. The Treaty of Peace between Estonia and
Russia,ss signed February 2, 1920, in article 2 states:
On- the basis of the right of all peoples freely to decide their
own destinies, and even to separate themselves completely from
the State of which they form part, a right proclaimed by the
Federal Socialist Republic of Soviet Russia, Russia unreservedly
37 See Note, The Annexation of the Baltic States and Its Effects on the Development of Law
Prohibiting Forcible Seizure of Territory, 6 N.Y.U. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 301 (1985). The official
study of the Baltic case was carried out by the so-called Kersten's Committee of U.S.
Congress in 1954 and is presented in 3-volume document. Hearings Before the Select
Committee on Communist Aggression. H. Rept., 83d Cong. 2d Sess., (1954).
38 Feb. 2, 1920, Estonia-Russia, 11 L.N.T.S. 51.
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recognizes the independence and autonomy of the State of
Estonia, and renounces voluntarily and forever all rights of
sovereignty formerly held by Russia over the Estonian people
and territory by virtue of the former legal situation, and by
virtue of international treaties, which, in respect of such rights,
shall henceforth lose their force. 9
Russian treaties with Latvia, signed August 11,' 1920, and Lith-
uania, signed July 12, 1920, contain similar clauses. The treaties
also included the recognition by Russia of the internationally pro-
vided neutrality of the Baltic states. From a purely legal stand-
point, these treaties meant the transition of "sovereignty" from a
former dominant state to new independent states. The Baltic
states' acquisition of sovereignty was not only a matter of fact, but
it also met the most rigid legal criteria. Two years later in 1922,
the Baltic states were admitted as full-scale members to the League
of Nations. The Soviet Union joined the League of Nations in
1934 and was expelled from it in 1939 because of its aggression
against Finland. Therefore, between 1934 and 1939 the relations
between the Baltic states and the Soviet Union were bound by the
Charter of the League of Nations. Bilateral relations between the
Baltic states and the Soviet Union are also evidenced in several
treaties.4'
The Baltic states were also legally related to the Soviet Union
through a number of multilateral legal documents. These included
the Convention for the Definition of Aggression (or the so-called
Litvinov Convention of July 3, 1933),41 Treaty of Paris of 1928'
39 Id at art. 2.
40 Pact of Mutual Assistance Between the Republic of Latvia and the Union of Sovi-
et Socialist Republics, Oct. 5, 1939, Latvia-U.S.S.R., 198 L.N.T.S. 381; Pact of Mutual Assis-
tance Between the Republic of Estonia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Sept.
28, 1939, Estonia-U.S.S.R., 198 LN.T.S. 227; Convention Relating to Conciliation Proce-
dure Between Latvia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, June 18, 1932, Latvia-
U.S.S.R., 148 LN.T.S. 129; Convention Between Lithuania and the Union of Soviet So-
cialist Republics for the Definition of Aggression, July 5, 1933, 148 LN.T.S. 79; Concilia-
tion Convention Between Estonia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, June 16,
1932, Estonia-U.S.S.R., 131 L.N.T.S. 309; Treaty of Non-Aggression and Peaceful Settle-
ment of Disputes Between Estonia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, May 4,
1932, Estonia-U.S.S.R., 131 LN.T.S. 297; Treaty of Non-Aggression Between the Republic
of Lithuania and the Uinion of Soviet Socialist Republics, Sept. 28, 1926, Lithuania-
U.S.S.R., 60 L.N.T.S. 145. None of these documents had expiration dates before Dec. 31,
1945.
41 July 3, 1933, 147 L.N.T.S. 69 [hereinafter Litvinov Convention].
42 Treaty Providing for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Poli-
cy, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, T.S. No. 796, 94 L.N.T.S. 57 (entered into fore July 24,
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and the Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (or so
called Montevideo Convention of December 26, 1934).1 Al-
though the U.S.S.R. was not a signatory to the Montevideo Con-
vention, the Convention was considered to be a part of jus cogens
of the time. These documents show that the relations between the
Soviet Union and the Baltic states were regulated by a solid set of
internationally and legally binding acts.
Although it lacks any specific legal significance, the Decree on
Peace of 1917 deserves mentioning at this point." Soviet Russia,
in the Decree written by Lenin, unilaterally declared and adopted
during the Second Congress of Soviets its own definition of annex-
ation. It stated:
If any people are held by force in defiance of its expressed
wish, are not given the right of decision, free from every du-
ress, by free elections, without the presence of those armed
forces of the incorporating state or any more powerful state, of
what form of national existence it wishes to have then the
incorporation of such a state should be called annexation, an
act of seizure and force.4
The Soviet Union breached all of these documents, however,
in June 1940, by their violent aggression against and subsequent
occupation of the Baltic states. There is no need to present an
analysis to prove this conclusion, as it has already been analyzed
by hundreds of scholars. It is enough to mention that this legal
qualification-that the U.S.S.R.'s actions in 1940 and thereafter
amounted to aggression and occupation-was also officially adopt-
ed by the supreme legislatures of the Baltic Republics in their offi-
cial resolutions in 1989-1990. The constitutional documents im-
posed on Baltic governments by Soviet force and issued by the
puppet regimes in 1940 were declared to be legally invalid and
the legal goal of them could be characterized as restitutio in integ-
rum.4 Based on these considerations and the will of the Baltic
1929). The treaty, popularly known as the Briand-Kellogg Pact, designed a framework for
the peaceful settlement "of all disputes and conflicts."
43 Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, T.S. No. 881, 165 L.N.T.S. 19 (entered into for Dec.
26, 1934) [hereinafter Montevideo Convention].
44 Decree of Peace, Nov. 8, 1917 (Russian text available from the author); for an
English translation, see Note, supra note 37, at 411.
45 Id.
46 See, eg., Declaration Regarding Mandate of U.S.S.R. President Mikhail Gorbachev
during the Upcoming Summit with U.S. President George Bush, beginning May 30, 1990,
in Washington, D.C., signed May 26, 1990, by Foreign Affairs Ministers of Estonia, Latvia,
and Lithuania.
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peoples, the Baltic states declared their independence. Lithuania
declared its independence de jure, and Estonia and Latvia de-
clared a transitional period in which to restore their indepen-
dence.
But here we have already run ahead of the events.
B. Does Aggression Expire?
The Baltic states were occupied in 1940, and it is now 1991.
From the justification of the Baltic states' claims for the restora-
tion of their independence, the question arises whether the inter-
nationally unlawful acts of aggression and occupation have any
term of expiration. Or in other words, does the justification for
national self-determination in this case also include the fact of
being the victim of an aggression and occupation or does this fact,
overtime, lose its significance?
International law does not provide a clear answer to this ques-
tion. Neither the Litvinov Convention of 193347 nor its modem
successor, the United Nations Resolution on the Definition of
Aggression," gives any firm answer. Nevertheless, it seems that
these basic documents tend to interpret the temporal dimension
of aggression in a fairly broad way. The Litvinov Convention stated
that the act of aggression can "never" be legitimate, 49 and the
modem resolution includes a: more profound rule. Article 7 of the
Resolution states:
Nothing in this Definition ... could in any way prejudice the
right to self-determination, freedom and independence, as
derived from the Charter, of peoples forcibly deprived of that
right and referred to in the Declaration on Principles of Inter-
national -Law concerning 'Friendly Relations and Co-operation
among States in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, particularly peoples under colonial and racist regimes
or other forms of alien domination; nor the right of these
peoples to struggle to that end and to seek and receive sup-
port, in accordance with the principles of the Charter and in
conformity with the above-mentioned Declaration.'
47 See Litvinov Convention, supra note 41.
48 GA Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975),
reprinted in 13 I.LM. 710 [hereinafter Definition of Aggression].
49 See Litvinov Convention, supra note 41.
50 Definition of Aggression, supra note 48, at art. 7.
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Without further considerations, it can be stated that the texts
of modem international law do not reject the interpretation that
aggression is an unlawful act without any term of expiration. At
the same time, it is evident that such an unrestricted position is
vulnerable to the argument of reductio ad absurdum. It is hard to
believe that the aggressions and remaining consequences of the
actions of William the Conqueror, Eric the Red, or even the more
"recent" conquests by Peter the Great can be contested by the
means of modem international law and in the framework of mod-
em World Order. (Though one has to admit that some modem
territorial disputes unfortunately do refer back to the historical
events of centuries agol) The question of the practical applicability
of this principle, therefore, still remains.
The solution may lie in the framework of the general theory
of recognition. The idea of "eternal" nonrecognition of the results
acquired through aggression is based on the principle ex iniuria
ius non oritur (legal rights will not arise from wrongdoing). The
principle itself is adequate, but rigid application of it creates cer-
tain difficulties. The fact is that certain acquisitions of new territo-
ries remain intact de facto and sooner or later must be recognized
as such by the world community. Initially illegal, they become part
of the international territorial structure, and through gradually
increasing recognition, they obtain in the long-run recognized,
legal title as well. As a matter of fact, the unlawfulness of a given
aggression tends to expire. That is, unfortunately, the hope of all
aggressors.
Though I am unable to determine what the exact term of
expiration is, there may be more or less distinct temporal instanc-
es when this actual expiration starts. For practical reasons, it may
be admitted that this term starts after considerable resistance to
the occupation ceases to exist or-from the international point of
view-when the fact of an occupation of territory in question
ceases to be of international political interest or concern.
This principle is referred to as the "presumption in favor of
established governments."5 ' Though Lauterpacht, for instance,
related its applicability to the sphere of the revolutionary situation,
this principle also seems to apply in the case of aggression and a
long-term occupation. The de jure recognition of the former gov-
ernment lasts until, as Lauterpacht states, "the lawful government
offers resistance which is not ostensibly hopeless or purely nomi-
51 H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 1, at 94.
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nal."52 The recognition, in fact, tends to be prolonged also if the
appearance of a new government (a puppet regime) has been
unlawful or resulted from international wrongdoing (aggression).
Once again I must admit that this proposition-that aggres-
sion may expire-cannot be accepted as morally or even legally
valid, but, unfortunately, we have to accept it as a fact of interna-
tional policy.
C. The Resistance to Occupation
The regular troops of the Baltic states did not actually mili-
tarily resist the Soviet Army's invasion in 1940. The strength of the
forces were too unequal. By 1940, the number of Soviet troops
located on the territory of Estonia was seven times as great as the
regular army of Estonia. The situation was the same in Latvia and
Lithuania. In 1940 and 1941, and even more so after World War
II, instances of anti-Soviet guerrilla warfare can be traced, however.
While under the Nazi-German occupation in 1941-44, the resis-
tance movements of formerly independent Lithuania, Latvia, and
Estonia managed to form underground governmental bodies (Na-
tional Committee in Estonia, Central Committee in Latvia and Su-
pieme Committee for the Liberation in Lithuania)53 aimed at
restoring the independence of the Baltic states. Steps were also
taken according to the constitutions of those states to preserve the
legality of these bodies to guarantee the legal continuity of their
existence.' Though these efforts failed, and the Nazi-German
occupation was immediately followed by Soviet occupation, their
existence in the first place is proof of the political resistance
against these occupations.
The armed guerilla-warfare against the Soviet rule which took
place after the World War II is further proof of resistance. This
fact was very important for the legitimization of the Baltic states'
"secessionist" claims for national self-determination. The guerilla-
warfare was evidently not an ethnic struggle for ethnic rights, but
a military and political action justifying the modem claims for the
restoration of independent national statehood and for the pro-
longation of the expiration term of the Soviet occupation.
52 Id.
53 See Note, supra note 37, at 386.
54 Dr. Yuri Pyld of Tartu University has analyzed this subject extensively.
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The fact that the Soviet Union has never recognized these
guerrilla fighters as the soldiers of belligerent parties and POWs is
also worth noting. By treating them as criminals (the official Soviet
term for guerrilla units was "bandit formations"), the Soviet Union
committed an international crime, violating the Hague Convention
on land warfare" and even the principles of the Agreement for
the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals." Al-
though it lacks retroactive legal power, it is worth mentioning that
the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War defines "prisoners of war" in part as the "members . . . of
organized resistance movements. "57 Furthermore, though the gue-
rilla war in the Baltic states was almost over by the time of the
signing of the Geneva Convention and many guerilla-fighters had
already been executed without a trial, many of them were still
serving their terms in Soviet concentration camps even though the
Soviet Union had already signed the Geneva Convention on Au-
gust 12, 1949.58
55 Convention (No. IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, with
Annex of Regulations, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539, 205 Parry's T.S. 277
(entered into force, Jan. 26 1910).
56 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of
the European Axis Powers and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8,
1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279. Article 6 of the Agreement, the so-called
"Nuremberg Charter" applies conditionally to this case. The "Nuremberg Charter" was
aimed at the punishment of the authorities of the "European Axis Powers," but the prin-
ciples set forth by this Act are of greater international significance.
57 Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 2,
6 U.S.T. 3316, T.IAS. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force, Oct. 21, 1950; for the
United States, Feb. 2, 1956) [hereinafter Geneva Convention].
58 The U.S.S.R. also violated other international legal principles at that time. By
mass deportations of civilians (at least 350 thousand from Lithuania alonel), the Soviet
Union violated the Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (entered into force,
Oct. 21, 1950; for the United States, Feb. 2, 1956) and committed the crime of geno-
cide.
The U.S.S.R. violated international law (international criminal law included) on
other occasions by its nonrecognition of the Baltic states (or in Soviet terminology: "Sovi-
et Socialist Republics") as occupied territories. Although these incidents are politically sig-
nificant (for instance, the mass refusal of Baltic citizens to serve in the Soviet army was
justified by article 51 of the Geneva Convention, see supra note 57) as additional motives
for the secessionist movements in the Baltic states, they are almost irrelevant to the theo-
retical purposes of this Article.
Nevertheless one terminological specification must be given here. The term "seces-
sion" is not precisely the correct term because it is impossible to secede from a Union
one has never joined. It is more precise to speak about the restoration of independence
by an occupied state. Only with these reservations in mind is the term "secession" used
in this Article.
[Vol. 66:1385
THE BALTIC STATES
The term of expiration for the Soviet aggression and occupa-
tion of the Baltic states also had been extended by the fact that
the occupation had constantly remained a matter of international
concern. The continuing recognition of diplomatic and consular
representations of the Baltic states in exile and the policy of the
nonrecognition of Soviet puppet regimes, on the Baltic territories
manifested this continual international concern.
D. The "New Renaissance"
Until 1988, the situation in the Baltic states was fairly stable,
and we cannot trace any evidence of considerable legal impact
there. Some minor groups that tried to express their resistance to
the existing regime were unable to change the actual legal situa-
tion in the Baltic states. The situation changed in the fall of 1988
when the mass popular political movements (popular fronts) ap-
peared. Though not particularly clear in their initial statements,
they still must be considered to be massive political opposition of
international legal importance.
After the transition of state power to these former opposition
groups (the transition was in whole accordance with Soviet law),
some steps of international legal importance were made. On
March 11, 1990, the Supreme Council of Lithuania declared the
independence of Lithuania to be restored de jure, and the su-
preme legislative bodies of Latvia and Estonia initiated transitional
periods with the goal of restoring the independence of these re-
publics or states. These acts were not of an ethnic, but of a na-
tional self-determinative character. After these legal motions, the
occupational character of the Soviet Union's presence in the Baltic
territories, somewhat implicit and habitual during last decades,
again became legally evident.
Though the legal status of the Baltic states had become legally
equivocal since the very beginning of their occupation, it was not
a sound legal problem for the world community for many years.
The de jure Baltic states, represented by governmental, diplomatic,
and consular offices in exile, and the de facto republics on the
Baltic territories existed in different worlds without any legal or
even political influences upon each other. The above-mentioned
equivocality, therefore, existed in theory rather than in reality.
The situation changed after the transition of power because
the new legislatures in the Baltic states were, for the first time
since the Soviet aggression, elected in a democratic way. They
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were representative bodies which expressed their political opposi-
tion to the Soviet dominance over their territories.
The qualification of the Baltic states' international legal status
under the still valid Montevideo Convention remained controver-
sial. According to article 2 of that text, "the federal state shall
constitute a sole person in the eyes of international law,"59 and
the Soviet Union's official position had always been that the Baltic
states, after they had "voluntarily joined" the U.S.S.R., had become
constituent parts of the Soviet Union.'
Nonetheless, the legislatures of the Baltic republics, which
were recognized by the Soviet Union, undertook steps aimed at
the restoration of their sovereignty and independence. And
though these new legislatures and governments were not recog-
nized de jure as the bodies of independent states, the same Mon-
tevideo Convention nevertheless provided them some international
legal personality in article 3. The text states:
The political existence of the state is independent of the other
states. Even before recognition the state has the right to de-
fend its integrity and independence, to provide for its conserva-
tion and prosperity, and consequently to organize itself as it
sees fit, to legislate upon its interests, administer its services,
and to define the jurisdiction and competence of its courts.
The exercise of these rights has no limitation that the
exercise of the rights of other states according to international
law.6'
It may be assumed, therefore, that the actions taken by the
U.S.S.R. aer the declaration of independence (Lithuania) or the
declaration of a transitional period aimed at restoration (Latvia,
Estonia) can be qualified to some extent as actions made with
respect to international legal standards of interstate and intergov-
ernmental behavior.
59 Montevideo Convention, supra note 43, at art. 2.
60 This firm stand of Soviet policy was weakened to some extent by the admission of
the Soviet Union of the existence of the confidential protocol to the Nazi-Soviet pact of
Aug. 23, 1939 that formed the political grounds for the Soviet aggression of 1940. The
official admission was made by the Second Congress of Peoples' Deputies of the U.S.S.R.
in Dec. 1989.
61 Montevideo Convention, supra note 43, at art. 3. It goes without saying that ac-
cording to international law, the U.S.S.R. did not have any rights over the Baltic states.
Article 5(3) of the Resolution on the Definition of Aggression states: "No territorial ac-
quisition or special advantage resulting from aggression is or shall be recognized as law-
ful." Definition of Aggression, supra note 48, at art. 5(3).
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The Soviet Union had tried to avoid this situation by propa-
gandistic statements that' the newly-elected parliaments and non-
communist governments nominated by these parliaments did not
adequately express the will of their nations. The overwhelming
support for the independence of Lithuania shown by the referen-
dum of February 9, 1991, proved the groundlessness of such state-
ments made by Gorbachev (who himself has never passed the test
of popular voting-neither as a deputy for the seat guaranteed to
the Communist Party, nor as the President of the Soviet Union).
It seems to me that from the international legal point of view,
a referendum is not an absolutely necessary condition for the
right of national self-determination to be exercised in a proper
way. The International Court of Justice, in the already mentioned
Western Sahara case, admitted that the General Assembly of the
U.N. retained a considerable "measure of discretion with respect
to the . . . procedure" by which the right for self-determination is
to be realized.62 Technically, even Soviet Russia itself in the De-
cree on Peace admitted the adequacy of different forms of expres-
sion of the will for self-determination up to the obtainment of
independent statehood. The allowable forms include press publica-
tions, programs of political parties. Furthermore, the Soviet Union
had never contested the constitutionality and legality of these
newly-elected state bodies in the Baltic states.
From this perspective, the actions taken by the U.S.S.R.
against the Baltic states in 1989-90 should not be viewed as actions
of the internal affairs of the Soviet Union. However, in January
1991, Gorbachev labeled the concern of European and North
American States over the events in Lithuania and Latvia as an
interference in Soviet internal affairs. Nonetheless, the events that
once might have looked like instances of internal disorder or
misconduct acquire a principally different legal status now.
E. The International Legal Consequences
The first instance of renewed Soviet aggression against the
Baltic states was the economic blockade imposed on Lithuania
after it adopted its declaration of independence.6 This act may
have qualified as a violation of article 1 of the Declaration on the
62 See HANNUM, supra note 20, at 38.
63 The blockade was, by the way, a violation of the Soviet municipal law; namely the
Declaration of the Second Congress of Peoples' Deputies of Dec. 24, 1989, which con-
demned all kinds of blockades aimed at the achievement of political goals.
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Inadmissability of Intervention, 64 adopted December 21, 1965,
which states that "[n]o state has the right [to use] . . . attempted
threats against... economic ... elements" of any other state.
Under the Resolution on the Definition of Aggression, "the block-
ade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of anoth-
er State ' is an act of aggression. Therefore, these actions were a
continuation of the Soviet Union's aggression against Lithuania
which had begun in 1940.
This Soviet blockade against Lithuania included another legal
problem. Some parallels exist between this blockade and the naval
blockade used by the Union government against the Confederate
states during the American Civil War. The American blockade was
recognized by foreign governments like Great Britain as a legally
valid action of the lawful government. The Lithuanian blockade
was in some respects similar. In both cases, the blockade was in-
troduced by an internationally recognized government, nor was it
violated by third parties. This respect by third parties of the block-
ade could be interpreted as the de facto lack of recognition of
both the Southern Confederacy and Lithuania. But there is one
principal difference between these cases. The sovereignty of the
U.S. government was recognized for the whole territory of the
United States, southern states included, while the sovereignty of the
U.S.S.R. has not been recognized over its entire territory, includ-
ing the Baltic states. The nonviolation of the Lithuanian blockade
was, therefore, a matter of political realities and not the abandon-
ment of the long-standing policy of nonrecognition.
If one accepts the existence of the Lithuanian state de jure
after its declaration of independence according to article 3 of the
Montevideo Convention, then the whole set of events in Lithuania
in January 1991, including the military actions and the creation of
the shadowy pro-Soviet National Salvation Committees, must be
viewed as a violation of article 2 of the 1965 Declaration on the
Inadmissability of Intervention. Article 2 states: "No State shall
organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, ter-
rorist or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of
64 Declaration on the Inadmissability of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of the States and
the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty, GA. Res. 2131, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 14) 11, U.N. Doc. A/6014, (1966), reprinted in 5 I.L.M. 374 [hereinafter Declaration
on the Inadmissability of Intervention].
65 Definition of Aggression, supra note 48, at art. 3(c).
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the regime of another State, or interfere in civil strife in another
State."66
These examples of the Soviet Union's breach of law may be
easily multiplied, but they all have a common feature. To some
extent, the international crimes committed by the U.S.S.R. against
the Baltic states resulted from the fact that the Soviet Union still
refused to recognize its former aggression and continuing occupa-
tion of the Baltic states.67 The irony of international law is that it
practically and even legally tolerates its most extreme and cynical
violations. The aggressor or the occupying state may be con-
demned if the state admits the facts of aggression and occupation,
but its condemnation is much more difficult in more extreme
cases in which even those facts, or at least the legal qualifications,
are simply denied.
F. Implicit Recognition by the U.S.S.R.
At the same time, it may be said that some instances of Soviet
policy (not to mention "the acts of genocide and the imposed
migration to the Baltic states) implicitly prove that in some spe-
cific cases the Soviet Union itself had admitted the continuous
legal status of the Baltic states. These admissions occurred despite
the fact that the Baltic states were technically and de facto an
integral part of the U.S.S.R. as a whole.
On August 23, 1944, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of
the U.S.S.R. issued a decree concerning the transfer of certain
territories of South-Eastern Estonia to- neighboring Russia. Al-
though the Soviet Constitution requires changes to the territory of
republics to be approved by the consent of the republics involved,
this formality was not followed. On January 18, 1945, only a half a
year later, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian
S.S.R. admitted the liquidation of a corresponding administrative-
territorial unit of the republic.' This action is inexplicable in
terms of the Soviet law itself and is quite strange with respect to
the careless rush in which it was carried out. Why make such
changes in the territorial boundaries at all if, after the "friendly"
joining of Estonia into the U.S.S.R., there would be republics that
66 Dedaration on the Inadmissability of Intervention, supra note 64, at art. 2.
67 Even later when the U.S.S.R. finally did recognize the Baltic states' independence,
the official statement on Sept. 6, 1991 made only a vague reference to "historical circum-
stances" and did not provide any legal evaluation.
68 Dr. Heiki Lindpere has studied the legal aspects of this event.
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were part of the same federation on the both sides of the former
state border? Both sides would have the same political and social
qualities; both would be states of "workers and peasants" and share
even the same ideological doctrine and "infinite love" towards the
great Stalin. What difference does the transition of territory make?
These questions disappear once we admit that this action was not
based on the official statements of Soviet propaganda and law, but
rather on the implicit assumption that for some time at least Esto-
nia remained an occupied territory of a foreign country. The
political task of the Soviet Union was to obtain as many advan-
tages from this aggression as possible. This assumption was never
articulated or admitted in public, but was nevertheless implicitly
assumed.
Jumping over the intervening four decades, we can provide
some more instances of similar political and legal significance.
After Lithuania's declaration of independence on March 11, 1990,
Lithuania has been, in fact, accused of violating the Soviet Consti-
tution even though at that time that Constitution no longer legally
bound Lithuania, even if it did before as an act of an occupation-
al regime. Lithuania also had been referred to as the Soviet So-
cialist Republic or the S.S.R., in verbal statements of the federal
government. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union had implicitly admit-
ted the absence of Lithuanian deputies from the third and fourth
Congresses of Peoples Deputies and from the Supreme Soviet of
the U.S.S.R. Without any meaningful settlement or even any settle-
ment attempts, the Soviet Union had implicitly admitted that Sovi-
et legislation may be imposed on Lithuania without its formal
participation in the legislation's promulgation. This admission did
not fit into the concept of the Baltic states as "Soviet Republics,"
but was explicable as an effort by the Soviet Union to impose
Soviet legislation upon a country that was not part of the Soviet
federation.'
In contrast to these instances of implicit recognition of the
specific legal status of Baltic states, the Soviet Union, whose consti-
tution admits the right of its republics to secede from the Union,
still insisted that the Baltic states' secession from the Union be in
69 On April 28, 1990, the Supreme Soviet was forced to accept the Baltic proposal,
the so-called "quorum clause," that to some extent legalized their absenteeism because of
problems with its own quorum (all the deputies of Lithuania and most from Estonia and
Latvia had left.). It states that if a deputy or a group of deputies declares it impossible
to participate in the process of adopting a law, they are excluded from the quorum on
this particular issue.
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accord with the patterns of Soviet law. The Soviet Union insisted
on this despite the fact that Soviet law was imposed on the Baltic
states by political and military might and was derived from the
actual occupation of these states.
G. The Soviet Law on Secession
This Article is not the proper place to discuss U.S.S.R. law
dealing with the mechanisms of secession of republics from the
Soviet Union which was passed by the Supreme Soviet on April 3,
1990. When that law was passed, Lithuania's deputies were absent
in corpore, and the majority of Latvian and Estonian deputies also
were not participating. Instead, it is enough to say that the law is
technically void and even principally nonrealizable as was proved
by the analysis of Baltic officials and jurists."0 From a political
point of view, this law lost all of its value, including its propagan-
da value after the collapse of the Soviet federation as a result of
the failed coup in August, 1991. I will emphasize here only a few
aspects that are, or rather were, relevant from the international
legal point of view.
First, the application of this law to the Baltic states was prob-
lematic in itself. People and territories that have never joined the
union and remain under alien occupation cannot secede from
that union, anymore than they can secede by following the rules
imposed upon them by that union without their own consent.7'
The Baltic states' acceptance of the terms of the federal law on se-
cession would imply a recognition of the legal authority of the
Soviet Union over the Baltic territories, and could mean even
some ex post facto legitimization of the more than four decades
of Soviet rule in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.
This danger of implicit acceptance was why the referendum
carried out in Lithuania on February 9, 1991, was cautiously re-
ferred to by Lithuanian officials as a "poll of public opinion" or,
later, as a "plebiscite" for the amendment of the Lithuanian con-
70 The Baltic Press published analytic experts of different law societies and lawyer
associations.
71 Naturally, no referendums were held in 1940 in the Baltics on whether to join
the U.S.S.R. The problem of plebiscites on the self-determination of the Baltic peoples in
the post-war period was slightly touched by Roosevelt and Churchill during their summit-
meetings with Stalin in Teheran and Yalta, but the leaders of the U..S.A and the U.K.
never obtained an answer to that question from the U.S.S.R.
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stitution.72 This referendum, undeniably, was- not meant as fulfill-
ment of the demands of the Soviet law on secession.
The Soviet law which formally provided the republics with the
mechanism of secession-:-the right for secession itself is guaran-
teed by the article 72 of the Soviet Constitution-embodied princi-
pal breaches of international law as well. In such cases, the mod-
em jus cogens demands the observation of voting and the counting
of votes by neutral international observers. This possibility is not
excluded by the Soviet law, but this law includes a very substantial
admission. According to section 5 of the law, foreign observers
(only from the U.N.) are admitted only if the Supreme Soviet of
the U.S.S.R "considers this to be needed." The legally elected rep-
resentative bodies of the republics do not have any input on this
question.
From the international legal point of view, what the law does
not say is more important than what it does say. Most notably, the
presence of the Soviet troops (like in the Baltic territories) was
not mentioned. The latest proceedings in the Baltic states proved
that their presence in the Baltic states was not as innocent from
the internal point of view as it might seem. Commenting on the
behavior of the Soviet troops in Lithuania, President V.
72 In Latvia, the plebiscite on March 3, 1991 was called an "Advisory Vote." Techni-
cally the question put to the vote in Lithuania was whether to include in the Constitu-
tion of Lithuania the following statement: "Lithuania is an independent democratic re-
public."
This may be compared to the question put to the vote on the federal referendum
of March 17, 1991 that did not include any reference to the possibility of leaving the
Union at all, although formally it was designed by the Soviet peoples for the Soviet peo-
ples to exercise the right for self-determination by the Soviet peoples. The question for
that referendum was: "Do you think it necessary to preserve the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics as a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics, in which the rights and
freedoms of the people of all nationalities will be fully guaranteed?"
I do not want to critique the style of the question that presents an example of
poetry rather than of a legal test, but the proposed question includes at least three is-
sues: (1) Whether to preserve the Union or not; (2) Whether it must be a renewed
federation; (3) Whether it must be a federation of "sovereign" republics.
At the same time, the position of Lithuania excluded the possibility to devoid the
former decisions of the Lithuanian parliament (especially, the Declaration of Indepen-
dence) of legality as the valid acts for self-determination. In the resolution addressed to
the international community, passed after the plebiscite, the Supreme Council of Lithua-
nia urged only "to take into account the results of the plebiscite held on the 9 February
1991" and viewed the results as the "confirmation" of the former acts of the newly elect-
ed Parliament. This is a direct counterclaim to the Soviet Union's stand that only a ref-
erendum carried out according to the Soviet rules may be considered as legally valid. (In
1940, the Soviet position was different: their unanimous "yes" vote by the puppet parlia-
ment was absolutely satisfactory for the justification of Soviet occupation.).
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Landsbergis simply stated that they resemble "the mob of bandits"
rather than a disciplined army. In fact, the Fourth Congress of
Peoples' Deputies refused to adopt an act prohibiting the involve-
ment of the army in internal iffairs. This refusal began the pro-
cess of parliamentary suicide that was completed by the Commu-
nist junta in August 1991. The number of Soviet troops in Baltic
territory was very considerable, and under the Soviet law on se-
cession, these troops were not unequivocally excluded from the
electorate of the referendum on self-determination. It might be
assumed that the majority of servicemen who do not have any
connections with the Baltic states tend to vote in favor of federal
Soviet authorities. In comparison, article 4 of the Declaration on
the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peo-
ples" states: "All armed action or repressive measures of all kinds
directed against dependent peoples shall cease in order to enable
them to exercise peacefully and freely their right to complete
independence, and the integrity of their national territory shall be
respected." 74
The question of the applicability of this act in the Baltic case
must be answered next. The Declaration was aimed at decoloniza-
tion and not at the procedure of national self-determination in
general. But the Act may still apply to the Baltic case. First, the
Declaration's preamble states its applicability to cases of "all de-
pendent peoples," and the peoples of the Baltic states were depen-
dent in this sense. Second, colonial dependency and occupation as
a victim of aggression are not phenomena that exclude each oth-
er. Moreover, colonization may appear as the result of a successful
aggression.75
The principle of the inadmissability of foreign interference
into the process of self-determination was reconfirmed by the
concluding document of the Vienna meeting of the CSCE in 1986.
Article 4 of that document states: "All peoples always have the
73 Declaration on Decolonization, supra note S.
74 Id. at art. 4.
75 The history of international law has a rule known as "salt-water-test," that meant
the separation of international law applicable for the dominion-states and that for the
colonies, i.e. territories that are separated from the colonial dominions by "salt a-
ter"---oceans and seas. It was based on the assumption that territories out of Europe are
terra nullius-nobody's lands,-- and the sovereignty there may be instituted by their mere
seizure and effective administration. Not only the modern political realities and ethical
principals but the very fact of the adoption of the Dedaration on Decolonization, supra note
3, serves as a proof that this test is not a valid part of international law anymore.
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right, in full freedom, to determine, when and as they wish, their
internal and external political status, without external interference,
and to pursue as they wish their political, economic, social and
cultural development."7"
Therefore, even if the law on secession of the Soviet Union
was in principle valid, and even if it applied to the Baltic states, it
still breached international law. With this in mind, the results of
the referendum in Lithuania appeared to be even more sound
given the very unfavorable conditions for the free expression of
the popular will of the nation of Lithuania. 7
H. The Problems of International Recognition
The problems connected with the actual and legal status of
the Baltic states still remained unsolved until the course of events
unexpectedly accelerated as a result of the events following the
failed coup of August 1991. Their governments were still neither
explicitly recognized de facto nor de jure as the governments of
independent states. Their officials and diplomatic envoys had been
received by the foreign governments only as private persons by the
Western States or as officials of Soviet bodies by the Soviet Union.
The first signs of possible recognition did appear in the first
months of 1991. Several countries such as Poland, Hungary, Den-
mark, and Iceland, had expressed their readiness to install
interparliamentary links with the Supreme Councils or Supreme
Soviets of the Baltic states. This step might be interpreted as the
recognition of the Supreme Councils as adequate representations
of these people. The pioneering role belonged to tiny Iceland
who, on February 11, 1991, made the first official proposal to
Lithuania to initiate talks concerning establishing diplomatic rela-
tions "as soon as possible." Denmark had also played a very active
role in obtaining the CSCE's support for the Baltic states. The
Danish parliament's proposal to organize an international confer-
ence on the Baltic question later obtained support from the Nor-
dic Council. Other countries have installed other forms of perma-
nent political contacts with the Baltics, but the problem of more
mature recognition still remained until late August 1991, when the
Baltic states' legal and political problems were solved and in Sep-
76 Vienna Document, supra note 32, at art. 4.
77 The official results were: Percent of the eligible voters who actually voted (from
their total number)-84.52; voted "yes"-90.42% "Yes" votes percent from the whole num-
ber of eligible voters: 76.78.
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tember 1991, when the Baltic states obtained their status as full-
scale members of the United Nations, recognized by tens of coun-
tries including the U.S.S.R. and the United States. It is worth
mentioning that during the coup of August 19-21, 1991, the differ-
ences in legal status between Lithuania and Estonia and Latvia
disappeared. Facing the threat of direct military actions by the jun-
ta, both Latvia and Estonia declared their independence and end-
ed the former transitional period.
Besides the necessity of acquiring diplomatic relations with
other countries before August 1991, other options could be ex-
plored. First, recognition could have been sought from the Inter-
national Court of Justice. Though this organization is a specialized
branch of the U.N., and the Baltic states were not members ac-
cording to United Nations article 35, the Statute of the Court
admits states that are not members of the United Nations as par-
ties in cases dealt with by the Court. Under the provision of arti-
cle 34, the requirement of statehood for parties in cases within
the jurisdiction of the court was met by the Baltic states even
according to the Soviet Constitution which in article 76 defines
each Soviet republic as a "sovereign socialist state."78 The jurisdic-
tion of the International Court covered the Baltic case due to arti-
cle 37 of its Statute. This Article recognizes the validity of the acts
of the League of Nations of which the Baltic states were once
members.
The main obstacle for this option was the fact that the Soviet
Union as a respondent in such a case may have simply refused to
accept the international jurisdiction for such a case, considering it
instead to be the internal affair of the U.S.S.R. Such a political
stand had been taken by the U.S.S.R. during the Paris summit of
the CSCE in November 1990, when the U.S.S.R. demanded the
removal of Baltic diplomats who were invited to be present as
observers. The same may be said about Soviet efforts to inspire
France to oppose the EEC pro-Baltic decisions by offering France
the reincarnation of the special Franco-U.S.S.R. relationship
established under the Gaulist governments. The Soviet position
had been explicitly manifested on February 5, 1991, during a
briefing by the Soviet Foreign Ministry's spokesman, Vitaly
•Churkin, who said, while 'criticizing the position taken by Iceland,
that "Itihe political dispute between the Baltic republics and the
78 KONST, SSSR § 76.
1991]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
U.S.S.R.'s authorities may not be settled on the basis of interna-
tional law."79 The nervousness of the Soviets over the legal and
political situation in the Baltic states was, nevertheless, unwillingly
revealed by a Soviet threat that if the United Nations entered into
the crisis, then the situation would receive an appropriate assess-
ment, and, if need be, even opposition from the Soviet Union.
The "new thinking" so actively propagated by Gorbachev, there-
fore, includes some chapters of the more traditional Soviet think-
ing dating from 1940.
The realization of the options provided by the Hague Court
presupposed continuing political and diplomatic efforts. The other
option for the Baltic states was provided by the Optional Protocol
to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,' now
recognized at least by the Soviet Union. This protocol establishes
procedures and jurisdiction for claims to the Human Rights Com-
mittee against the violators of the named Covenant. If article I of
the Covenant can be interpreted to grant a right of self-determina-
tion, then the Human Rights Committee should have been open
to the claims of the Baltic peoples.
CONCLUSION
This expanded discussion of the legal problems connected
with the recent status of the Baltic states was based on the as-
sumption that the right of national self-determination to the ex-
tent of obtaining or restoring their statehood is internationally
recognized and is more probable in cases where traditional criteria
for providing that right are complimented by political and legal
arguments. The first part of this Article discussed this theoretical
claim, and the case study was aimed at providing some evidence
for that claim. I hope that I have managed to show, or at least
lead you to see, the following:
(1) The legal problems connected with the recent status of
the Baltic states resulted from their legal status as the victims of
aggression and the subjects of alien occupation.
79 Kanishchev & Timofeyev, Moscow TASS, Feb. 5, 1991, reprinted in Churkin rews
Baltics, Gulf War, Other Issues, FBIS-SOV-91-025, Feb. 6, 1991, at 1. The Soviet position can
also be seen in the Soviet diplomatic demarche to the Nordic States. The demarche
which warned the Nordic States against supporting Baltic independence is reported in
Crona, Secret Soviet Warning to the Nordic Countries, Stockholm Svenska Dagbladet, Feb. 28,
1991 at 3, (in Swedish), reprinted in Nordic Countries Warned on Baltic Interence, FBIS-SOV-
91-043, March 5, 1991, at 48-49.
80 Supra note 3.
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(2) The claims for self-determination in the form of secession
from the Soviet Union (actually, the restoration of their indepen-
dence is more accurate than secesssion) were not of purely ethnic
but rather of national character. This means that the methods
provided by international law for the protection of purely ethnic
rights were not appropriate or sufficient in this case.
(3) The ethnic element, though present in the claims of the
Baltic states, was not a principal and decisive one in this case. The
ethnic natives of the Baltic states certainly acquired more reliable
protection of their ethnic rights through the restoration of their
independent statehood, but at the same time they served, merely
as the consolidating core for the Baltic nations as distinct, political
entities. The rights of other ethnic groups were protected then by
the democratic nature of the political regimes instituted in the
Baltic states. This may cure them from the wounds caused by the
tragic and dramatic past events of the Soviet regime.

